My areas of research are consciousness studies, moral psychology, and value theory.
In my dissertation, I discuss the phenomenology, metaphysics, and ethics of pleasure and pain. I focus on their non-sensory varieties: emotional, aesthetic, and epistemic pleasure and pain. I argue that in order to do justice to the phenomenology of pleasure and pain we need to admit of non-sensory modalities of experience. A hedonic tone view of the nature of pleasure and pain becomes highly plausible. I finally consider how this view responds to fundamental challenges for hedonism about well-being: alienation, self-abasement, and self-deception. Here is a list of my published articles:
“Emotional Experience and the Senses” (2022)
in Philosophers’ Imprint 22: 20, pp. 1-20.
In this paper I investigate the nature of emotional experience in relation to the senses, and I defend the thesis that emotional experience is partly non-sensory. First, I draw on Plato to set some conditions on what counts as sensory experience. Then, I present two arguments against the claim that emotional experience is wholly sensory: my first argument is based on the possibility of knowledge of emotion by acquaintance; my second argument is based on the non-sensory nature of valence.
In my dissertation, I discuss the phenomenology, metaphysics, and ethics of pleasure and pain. I focus on their non-sensory varieties: emotional, aesthetic, and epistemic pleasure and pain. I argue that in order to do justice to the phenomenology of pleasure and pain we need to admit of non-sensory modalities of experience. A hedonic tone view of the nature of pleasure and pain becomes highly plausible. I finally consider how this view responds to fundamental challenges for hedonism about well-being: alienation, self-abasement, and self-deception. Here is a list of my published articles:
“Emotional Experience and the Senses” (2022)
in Philosophers’ Imprint 22: 20, pp. 1-20.
In this paper I investigate the nature of emotional experience in relation to the senses, and I defend the thesis that emotional experience is partly non-sensory. First, I draw on Plato to set some conditions on what counts as sensory experience. Then, I present two arguments against the claim that emotional experience is wholly sensory: my first argument is based on the possibility of knowledge of emotion by acquaintance; my second argument is based on the non-sensory nature of valence.
